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A CIRCUS AMONG THE CIRCUITS: WOULD THE TRULY FAMOUS
AND DILUTED PERFORMER PLEASE STAND UP? THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT AND ITS CHALLENGES
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen*

I. Introduction
Sometimes, nothing is more painful than the truth. Congress passed the celebrated
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“the Act” or the “Dilution Act”) with great hope
that it would create a uniform anti-dilution law, end forum shopping, and encourage
trademark owners to build brand equity with more ease. Congress was overwhelmingly in
favor the Act, and thus passed it with little debate, leaving behind a sparse congressional
record. In its haste to pass the Act, Congress failed to address whether the Act extends to
product design marks; whether the Act requires proof of actual economic harm, or if
likelihood of dilution is an acceptable standard; how fame and dilution should be
measured; and the degree of fame or dilution required under the Act.
Trademark owners now have to bear the cost of congressional failure. For the time
being, trademark owners are facing conflicting interpretations of the Dilution Act coming
from the First, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The other circuit courts, expectedly, will
soon follow suit when they have their chance to address the Act. Each of the circuit courts
that has had the opportunity to address the Act has its own idea about dilution and fame, the
meaning of dilution, how to establish fame, and how to prove dilution. With the conflicting
rulings from these circuits, there is a circus among the circuits. Each performer at the circus
is carrying its own act leaving trademark owners a federal anti-dilution system that is
almost as chaotic as the original patchwork system of more than twenty-five state statutes.
Trademark owners will continue to shop for a forum that has the best anti-dilution
protection where the owners do not have to satisfy, among others, the stringent requirement
of actual economic harm to the famous mark.
*159 In Part I, this Article will expose the congressional failure. Part I also provides
an analysis for each of the issues left out by Congress. These issues include: (a) the
problems with providing a patent-like protection to product design marks under the Act;
(b) the problems with proof of actual dilution versus likelihood of dilution; (c) the
*
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problems with “famous;” and (d) the problems with undefined terms in the Act, such as
“willful intent.” Part II analyzes, compares, and contrasts the dizzying circus acts of the
First, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit performers. Part III explains the reasons the fun at
the circus is over and offers various ways to orchestrate a new act for the benefits of
trademark owners, the courts and the public. Part IV concludes that if a uniform
interpretation of the Act is not soon formulated by the circuit courts, more chaos will occur,
and perhaps it is time to hear from the ringmasters--the Supreme Court or Congress.
II. A Quick Overview of the Dilution Act
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act went into effect on January 16, 1996,
providing a federal remedy to dilution of famous marks. The Act amends section 43 of the
Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act, to provide owners of
famous marks with injunctive relief1 against unauthorized use of a mark that dilutes the
distinctive quality of the famous mark.2 The Act adds a new subsection 43(c)(1) to the
Lanham Act:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court deems reasonable, to any injunction against another person’s
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after *160 the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous
mark ...3

The Act amends section 45 with a definition of dilution. The new definition states that
dilution is “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods
or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” 4
The new subsection 43(c)(2) of the Act provides remedies set forth in sections 35
and 36 of the Lanham Act. These remedies include damages and attorneys’ fees to a
1

Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1996).

2

Other provisions of the Lanham Act § 43 provide a cause of action for owners of
marks, regardless of whether the marks are registered, against unauthorized use that causes
false representation, association, sponsorship, advertisement or unfair competition. See 15
U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B); see also Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair
Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L.
Rev. 671, 704 (1984).
3

See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(1996), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
4

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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plaintiff if it is shown that the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.” The Act and its legislative history are
silent on the definition of “willfully intended.”
Under subsection 43(c)(1), not every mark is entitled to anti-dilution protection; the
Act protects only famous marks.5 The Act provides eight non-exclusive factors for courts
to consider in determining whether a mark is “distinctive and famous”: (A) the degree of
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the
duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of
the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or
services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the
trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner and the person against whom
the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the Principal Register.6
Since the Act is intended to provide protection against “commercial use” of a mark,
the Act exempts certain types of fair use of a mark from a dilution claim. Subsection (c)(4)
provides examples of fair use of a mark: using a mark in *161 comparative commercial
advertisement, noncommercial use of a mark, and news reporting and commentary.7
III. A Circus Created by Congressional Ill-Thought Legislation
In March of 1995, Representative Carlos Moorhead of California introduced a bill
to amend the Lanham Act to protect famous marks from dilution--the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995.8 The Act was passed with a strong reception from Congress and with
sparse legislative history. 9
In passing the bill, Congress was aware of the problems associated with
anti-dilution laws in twenty-five states. The “patchwork system” of state laws imposed
difficulties on owners of trademarks to build national brand awareness and management
5

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).

6

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).

7

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4).

8

See H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995).

9

See 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S19,312
(daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (the Senate passed the bill without debate).
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and encouraged forum shopping for states that offered the most favorable protection.10 In
addition, state laws lacked uniformity in the application of dilution theory. 11
Unfortunately, in its haste to pass the Act, Congress either was silent or failed to
provide in-depth discussion on issues such as (1) whether the Act applies to all marks,
including product configuration or design; (2) the meaning of dilution, and how dilution
must be demonstrated; (3) the meaning of “famous” and how “famous” is measured; and
(4) what types of conduct amount to willful intent, and whether remedies against such
conduct require proof of actual harm suffered by the famous mark, which has now become
less famous than it was before dilution. As demonstrated below, failure to address these
issues raises potential threats to the *162 constitutionality of the Act, causes
inconsistencies in the application of dilution theories, and creates a circus among the
circuits.
A. The Problems of Perpetual Patent-Like Protection: The Dilution Act and Product
Design
An examination of the plain language of the Dilution Act suggests that the Act
applies to a famous “mark” and does not restrict the definition of that term to word marks.12
Thus, without such a restriction, an argument could be made that the Act applies to all
marks including product design marks.13 This interpretation, however, raises a potential
constitutional problem: the Act potentially provides perpetual federal protection to a
product design which is normally subject to limited time protection under the federal patent
law.14

10

See 141 Cong. Rec. H14,318 (daily ed. Dec 12, 1995).

11

See Hearing on H.R. 1270, The “Madrid Protocol Implementation Act of 1995”
and H.R. 1295, the “Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995” Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
121-23 (1996) (statement of Thomas E. Smith, Section of Intellectual Property Law,
American Bar Association).
12

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 1998).

13

Id. at 45.

14

In I.P. Lund, Kohler challenged the constitutionality of the Dilution Act as
applies to product designs in violation of the federal patent law. Id. at 50. See also Stephen
K. Marsh, Recent Development, Patents Are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act to Apply to Product Configurations in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West
Bend Co., 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. 412 (1997).
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Since the Dilution Act is designed to benefit only the owners of the famous marks
and not the general public at large, the Act does not require the owners to prove public
confusion as to source.15 If Congress indeed intended to extend the reach of the Act to all
product designs that are famous, then Congress was creating a perpetual patent grant to the
famous product designs solely for the interest of the owner at the expense of the public. 16
Thus the public’s opportunity to benefit by purchasing similar products at a lower price is
prevented as the Act allows the owner of the product design to hold a perpetual monopoly
in the product design.17
*163 Whether Congress intended the Act to cover product designs requires scrutiny
in the spare legislative history and jurisprudence on patent and trademark conflicts.
Legislative history of the Act provides examples of blurring and tarnishment only for word
marks. 18 There are no examples of dilution of product design or configuration. This could
mean that Congress was cognizant that it is easy to understand dilution through blurring or
tarnishment if the famous mark is a word mark, but not if it is a product design mark where
the mark is the product itself. 19 According to the First Circuit, in a product design mark
case it is difficult to see how dilution through blurring or tarnishment can be shown where
the defendant has replicated some aspects of a plaintiff’s product design, and the result is a
defendant’s product that does not create consumer association between defendant’s
product and plaintiff’s product design mark.20
Moreover, in a dilution claim involving product design, often the real issue is not
interference with the source identification function of the product design, but rather
protection from appropriation of or free-riding on the investment that the plaintiff has made
in its known product design.21 Such investment is usually given patent protection, which is
limited in duration. 22
15

I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 48.

16

See Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the
Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J Intell.
Prop. L. 415 (1998).
17

See Id. See also Marsh, supra note 14.

18

See H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st sess. 104 (1995). See also I.P. Lund,
163 F.3d at 49-50.
19

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

See Marsh, supra note 14.
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Accordingly, the First Circuit has recently insisted on a vigorous review of the
product design in a dilution claim. 23 Though that court believes that the Dilution Act does
cover product designs, the court notes that there may be rare cases where Congress did not
envision protection under the Act for a product design from dilution by a competing
product.24 The court fears that a broad reading of the statute *164 allowing all forms of
product designs protection under the Act would push it to the “constitutional edge”
creating a conflict between patent and trademark law.25
Some commentators have flatly suggested that Congress intended to categorically
exclude product design from the protection provided under the Dilution Act.26 According
to these commentators, traditional federal trademark infringement protection for a product
design does not create a monopoly in the use of the design as long as that protection is
based on the consumer confusion rationale. 27 In that context, there is no conflict between
patent and trademark laws. 28 Outside the context of the traditional consumer confusion
rationale, federal patent law preempts any protection for product design. 29 Thus, blanket
anti-dilution protection for product designs under Dilution Act would violate the federal
patent law. A way to avoid such a violation is to exclude product design from the “mark”
definition under the Dilution Act.30
Such categorical exclusion, however, contradicts the plain language of the Dilution
Act, which does not restrict the definition of “mark” to a word mark.31 The exclusion
violates the statutory meaning of trademark, which includes not just words but symbols,
designs, or devices.32 In addition, such exclusion would reduce a product design that has
23

I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 50.

24

Id.

25

Id. See also Marsh, supra note 14.

26

Heald, supra note 16.

27

Heald, supra note 16. See also Marsh, supra note 14.

28

See Heald, supra note 16.

29

See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989);
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).#&160; See also Heald, supra note
16.
30

Heald, supra note 16.

31

See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 50.

32

See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1996).
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been functioning as a source identifier to a second class citizen status; it functions as a
trademark within the meaning of the statute but does not have all the privileges and
protection that all other trademarks currently enjoy. As demonstrated above, by passing the
Dilution Act without addressing whether the *165 Act reaches all types of marks, Congress
has created uncertainty where it envisioned resolution.
B. The Problems of Dilution: Actual Economic Harm to the Selling Power of a Famous
Mark or Likelihood of Dilution
The plain language of the Act requires that (1) the plaintiff’s mark is famous; (2)
the defendant’s use of the junior mark commencing after the plaintiff’s mark33 has become
famous; and (3) the use of the junior mark causes a “lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”34 The language of the Act seems
simple, direct and clear; however, it is more deceptive than this simple reading. Indeed, the
Act could be interpreted to require proof of actual dilution because the language of the Act
refers to a junior mark used after the plaintiff’s mark becomes famous and then the junior
mark causing dilution.35 The Act does not state that the use of the junior mark is likely to
cause or will cause dilution to the famous mark. This reasoning leads to the question of
what type of proof is required to show actual dilution.
The Fourth Circuit, in addressing proof of dilution, has imposed a stringent
requirement that actual economic harm be established by showing that the defendant’s use
of the junior mark lessened the demand for the plaintiff’s products or services.36 The First
Circuit, in a case involving a product design mark, has observed that the demand for a
plaintiff’s products is always lessened whenever a competing product achieves a
measurable degree of success.37 The fact that customers knowingly choose to pay less for a
similar product instead of paying more for a more famous product does not in and of itself
establish dilution through blurring. 38 According to the First Circuit, dilution through
blurring has to do with *166 the identification of a product, and that is not the same thing as

33

A junior mark is a mark that is used after the plaintiff’s mark has become

famous.
34

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

35

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
36

See Id.

37

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998).

38

Id. at 49.
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a lessening of demand. 39 Nevertheless, questions remain regarding whether the Act
requires proof of actual dilution or likelihood of dilution, and regarding what is an
acceptable degree of dilution. 40 A district court has also addressed proof of dilution by
relying on a consumer survey, which shows that 21% consumers in the geographical areas
where the defendant operated its convenience stores associated the defendant’s mark with
the plaintiff’s.41
The Fourth Circuit has recently held, however, that such proof of “association”
between the defendant’s mark and the plaintiff’s mark does not address the heart of actual
dilution.42 Because the Act does not provide any example or guidance on what dilution
means and how dilution can be shown, that Act essentially leaves open a wide range of
interpretations, including an extreme interpretation of actual dilution imposed by the
Fourth Circuit. 43 The Fourth Circuit has held that proof of actual dilution is shown by
evidence of actual economic harm to the selling power of the famous mark due to the use of
the junior mark by the defendant.44 In other words, the use of defendant’s mark lessened
the demand for *167 the plaintiff’s products or services in a measurable way. 45 The court
offered three means for demonstrating actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling
power: (1) actual loss of revenues; (2) contextual factors such as the junior mark’s
exposure, the similarity of the marks, and the firmness of the senior mark’s hold; and (3)
consumer survey. 46
39

Id.

40

The court in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. Of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 612, aff’d, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter
Ringling II], commented that “the Act does not specify how dilution occurs or how it may
be detected or measured.” The court suggests that “[b]ecause the effect of blurring may
manifest itself directly in harm to the selling power of the famous mark, dilution by
blurring may be shown by proof that the use of a junior mark has caused a lessening of
demand for the product or services bearing the famous mark or for use of the famous mark
in co-promotions” or dilution via blurring may be shown “by the direct evidence of a
survey of consumers and indirectly or circumstantially by the application of [the Mead
Data] multi-factor balancing test”).
41

WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

42

Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453.

43

See Id. at 459-61.

44

See Id. at 461.

45

See Id.

46

See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999).
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The proof of actual loss of revenues is very rare and difficult to obtain. 47 Because
dilution is a slow process, it would take years for the owner of a famous mark to be able to
quantify the actual loss of revenues due to the diminishment of the selling power of the
famous mark.48 Further, waiting for enough evidence to be quantifiable may cause the
owner of the famous mark to foreclose his opportunity to get preliminary injunctive relief
from the defendant.
The proof of “the extent of the junior mark’s exposure, the similarity of the marks,
and the firmness of the senior mark’s hold”49 is irrelevant, redundant and not helpful.
Although dilution through blurring more likely occurs if the junior mark is strong and has
independent image and reputation, “the extent of the junior mark’s exposure” is not
relevant in cases where the junior mark triggers no recollection or thought of the famous
mark.50 “The similarity of the marks” is not helpful because dilution can occur in cases
such as parody or tarnishment where the junior mark may not be very similar to the famous
mark.51 Furthermore, the Dilution Act does not require the junior mark to be similar to the
famous mark.52 “The firmness of the *168 senior mark’s hold” is a redundancy of the
“fame” analysis 53 because the Dilution Act only protects marks that are famous. A dilution
analysis is not necessary if the fame analysis reveals that the mark is not famous within the
meaning of the Dilution Act.54
The third type of proof requires a “consumer survey designed not just to
demonstrate mental association of the marks in isolation, but further consumer impressions

47

See Id.

48

See Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §§
24:90, 24:94, 160-61 (4th ed. 1997).
49

See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 465.

50

McCarthy, § 24:94.1, 24-165.

51

See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp 1183, 1190-91
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (ENJOY COCAINE and COCA-COLA)
52

See Lanham Act §43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1996).

53

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (the Dilution Act protects only famous marks; thus,
the fame analysis must take place prior to the dilution analysis. Therefore, it is redundant to
analyze the fame of the senior mark again in the dilution analysis).
54

See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(c). See also Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F.
Supp. 500, 519-21 (M.D.Pa. 1998).
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from which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred.”55 The third type of proof
seems plausible; however, the Fourth Circuit failed to address the degree of actual harm
that the consumer survey must show in order for the plaintiff to meet its evidentiary
burden. 56 Specifically, what percentage of “dilution” in the consumer survey is an
acceptable threshold of dilution?57
On the other end of the spectrum, a “likelihood of dilution” standard dominates a
dilution analysis. Courts that apply this standard often use a modified Mead Data test that
was originally formulated by Judge Sweet ten years ago in his concurring opinion in Mead
Data Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales.58 The original Mead *169 Data test included balancing
the factors: (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products; (3) sophistication of
the consumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the
junior mark.59 The modified Mead Data test eliminates the “similarity of the products” and
“predatory intent” factors because those factors belong to the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis and thus they are not appropriate in a dilution analysis. A modified
Mead Data test, as argued by several commentators, is significant because it allows an
owner of a famous mark to seek preliminary injunctive relief from a defendant who has yet
to market its dissimilar products with a junior mark that is similar to the famous mark. 60
In summary, with sparse congressional record providing guidance in order to
55

See Ringling at 465.

56

Patrick Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 295 (1999).
57

See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17
Franchise L. J. 111 (1998).
58

Many courts continue to use Judge Sweet’s concurring opinion in Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989), which
Judge Sweet used for interpreting the New York anti-dilution statute to analyze dilution
through blurring. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 519-21 (M.D.
Pa. 1998); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 1999 WL 47313 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999);
Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling Bros.-Barnum Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division
of Travel Development, 955 F. Supp. 605, 615-16 (E.D. Va. 1997); WAWA v. Haaf, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
59

See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035.

60

See Bible, supra note 56.
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consistently interpret the meaning of dilution and proof of dilution, the Dilution Act creates
a problem that Congress intended to correct: forum shopping for courts within a circuit that
has the most favorable and broadest protection. Trademark owners now would avoid courts
in the Fourth Circuit so that they do not have to demonstrate actual economic harm suffered
by the famous marks!
C. The Problems with “Famous”
“Famous” is an amorphous concept. It is difficult to determine whether a mark is
famous, how much fame a famous mark needs, and whether a famous mark is more famous
than another famous mark.61 The Dilution Act requires that only famous marks are entitled
to federal anti-dilution protection; however, the Act is of no assistance in resolving how
famous a mark should be in order for it to enjoy its protection.62 The Act provides a list of
eight non-exclusive factors for courts to *170 analyze to determine whether a mark is
famous; however, that list fails to quantify the fame of a mark. 63 Further, if a mark is found
famous, does it follow that the degree of fame the mark possesses should correlate with the
extent of protection it should receive?
In analyzing whether a mark is famous within the context of the Act, courts have
held that it is not sufficient that a mark has acquired secondary meaning. 64 The question
then would be whether such a mark could ever be accorded a status of famous. If the
answer is no, here lays the pitfall of trademark law: a mark that has acquired secondary
meaning would always be treated as a second class citizen compared to a mark that is
inherently distinctive or suggestive.
Thus, it is not surprising that some courts have erroneously found famous a number
of marks that are only known and recognized within a particular industry. 65 These cases
often involve domain names on the Internet. In the Internet cases, it seems that the courts
are willing to find a plaintiff’s mark famous, and that a defendant’s use of the mark as a
61

See Miles J. Alexander, Dilution Basics, in Dilution and Famous Marks for
Advanced Trademark Practitioners: Course Materials, March 5, 1998 (discussion on some
limitations of the Act); Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution’s Entry Into Federal
Trademark Law, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 215 (1997) (discussion on “famous” and its
effects on average business owners).
62

See Alexander, supra note 61; Serad, supra note 61.

63

Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1) (1996).

64

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).

65

See, e.g., Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977
F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D.Cal. 1997).
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domain name amounts to dilution. 66 This indicates that the courts want to accommodate
congressional desire to curb the use of deceptive domain names. 67 This poses a threat to a
uniform application of the Act; some marks are not qualified to get the protection but are
accorded such protection *171 simply because the use of the marks involves the Internet!
Additionally, in the non-Internet area, some courts find marks to be famous that enjoy very
little fame outside their narrowly defined markets.68
D. The Problems with the Undefined Term “Willfully Intended”
In an unexpected twist of fate, the Dilution Act’s undefined term “willfully
intended” has acquired a new meaning in a recent Fourth Circuit’s decision.69 The Fourth
Circuit in Ringling examined the Dilution Act and held that “causes dilution” requires
proof of actual economic harm because “cause” is not “will” or “may.” 70 The Fourth
Circuit found support for its ruling by contrasting the state dilution laws and the Dilution
Act. It noted that unlike state dilution statutes that only focus on future harm by providing
only injunctive relief, the federal statute focuses on consummated actual economic harm
suffered by the famous mark. 71 According to the Fourth Circuit, evidence for the
requirement of consummated actual economic harm is in the remedy provision against
“willful intend”. 72 Since the Act provides monetary and restitutionary damages against a
66

See Panavision International v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998)
(affirming the district court’s finding that dilution occurs when “potential customers of
[plaintiff] will be discouraged if they cannot find its web page by typing in
‘Panavision.com,’ but instead are forced to wade through hundreds of web sites.”); Jews
for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding dilution occurs
when “[p]rospective users of plaintiff’s services who mistakenly access defendant’s web
site may fail to continue to search for plaintiff’s own home page, due to anger, frustration
or the belief that plaintiff’s home page does not exist.”); Teletech, 977 F. Supp. at 1410
(finding that use of a search engine can generate as many as 1,000 matches and it is “likely
to deter web browsers from searching for Plaintiff’s particular web site”).
67

See Reichman, supra note 57.

68

Gazette Newpapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (D.Md. 1996);
Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
69

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999).
70

Id. at 460-61.

71

Id. at 458, 460.

72

Id. at 461.
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defendant who “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of
the famous mark,” it follows that the Act requires only proof of actual economic harm
suffered by the famous mark.73 Under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, “causes dilution”
becomes “caused dilution” and “willful intent” has become “consummated economic
harm”!
On the other hand, a different interpretation of the Dilution Act can be formulated
such that the Act’s subsection (c)(2) simply provides different remedies *172 against
different types of conduct committed by the defendant.74 If there is no willful intent then
the remedy is limited to injunctive relief. 75 If there is willful intent, then the remedy
includes monetary and restitutionary relief. 76 A narrow reading of the subsection inferring
that the Act absolutely requires proof of actual economic harm to the famous mark,
because there is the potential for monetary and restitutionary relief, is contrary to well
established trademark jurisprudence. Trademark law has long provided that proof of
likelihood of confusion is sufficient despite the fact that the Lanham Act allows for both
equitable and legal remedies under section 35(a).77
Moreover, section 35(a) provides remedies specific to trademark infringement or
likelihood of confusion claims under section 43(a), not dilution claims under section
43(c).78 The language of section 35(a) makes clear that only plaintiffs who own registered
trademarks asserting trademark violation under the Lanham Act or who allege likelihood

73

Id.

74

See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996).

75

See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1); Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1996).

76

See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(2).

77

Courts use balancing factors in finding proof of likelihood of confusion. See,
e.g., J&J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460 (Fed Cir. 1991); Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984); Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc.
v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916
(1982)); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979); James
Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976); Blockbuster
Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Berkshire
Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); McDonald’s Corp. v.
McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); A.T. Cross Co. v. TPM Distrib., Inc.,
226 U.S.P.Q. 521 (D.C. Minn. 1985); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
816, 823-24 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
78

See Lanham Act § 35(a).
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of confusion can obtain monetary damages. 79 The plaintiff does not have to prove actual
economic harm due to infringement or confusion of its mark under section 43(a). 80
Similarly, Congress grants a plaintiff *173 who prevails in a dilution claim monetary
remedies under section 35(a) which are identical to the remedies entitled to a plaintiff who
prevails in a trademark infringement or likelihood of confusion claim. This suggests that
Congress could have not intended section 43(c) to always require proof of actual dilution
or actual economic harm. 81
In its eager haste to pass the Moorhead bill, Congress failed to address the issues
noted above: perpetual patent-like protection, whether actual economic harm or likelihood
of dilution is required, and the extent of fame a mark must possess. These issues have
created a circus in place of the 25 clowns of the state statutes Congress originally wanted to
eliminate. The problems will only proliferate until either the Supreme Court clarifies the
meaning of the Dilution Act or Congress amends the Act with provisions to clarify the
issues noted above. Thus, the Dilution Act has brought uncertainty where it had set out to
resolve uncertainties. Once again, trademark owners are facing problems ranging from
constitutional challenges, inconsistent application of dilution theories, differing
interpretations of the Act, and the need for forum shopping.
As demonstrated below, several circuit courts have had the opportunity to interpret
the Dilution Act, and all of these courts seem to struggle with the concept of dilution. The
end result so far is a circus of decisions that are more disjoined than the “patch work
system” of state laws that existed before the enactment of the Dilution Act. Each performer
at the circus has its own ideas of what dilution is and how to prove dilution. Yet all
performers start out at the same point of origin: the language of the Dilution Act itself. The
audience at the circus--trademark owners and practitioners--are experiencing nothing less
than a dizzying performance. Perhaps the performance is getting too convoluted and is not
well orchestrated.
Below is a description of the various acts at the circus with critique.
IV. A View of the Performances of the Circuits at the Circus
A. The First Circuit: I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co.
The First Circuit has recently addressed the standards of determining dilution and
whether the Dilution Act applies to product designs in cases of first *174 impression for the
79

See Lanham Act § 35(a).

80

See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1996).

81

See Lanham Act § 43(c)(2).
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Circuit. 82 In this case, the plaintiff was the Danish manufacturer of VOLA faucets
designed by the noted architect Arne Jacobsen.83 The VOLA faucet is a single-control,
wall-mounted faucet with a handle that utilizes a thin cylindrical lever to adjust water
temperature and volume.84 The VOLA faucet has a spout and an aerator holder of uniform
diameter with the spout bending downward at right angles softened by a curve. The VOLA
faucet only fits no-hole sinks.85 The VOLA faucet has been on the market since 1969, has
received numerous awards, and has been displayed in the Museum of Modern Art. The
faucet has also been regularly advertised and featured in numerous magazines. 86
Defendant Kohler was the largest supplier of plumbing fixtures in the United
States. In 1994, Kohler contacted plaintiff Lund regarding the possibility of selling VOLA
faucets under Kohler’s name and subsequently bought eight VOLA faucets to test whether
the faucets met U.S. regulations. 87 Kohler gave a VOLA faucet to its industrial designer
who studied the VOLA faucet and then designed the Falling Water faucet. Kohler’s Falling
Water faucet contains most of the VOLA faucet features described above. 88 Kohler’s
Falling Water faucet is sold at lower price than the VOLA faucet.89 Co-defendant Robern,
prior to being acquired by Kohler in 1995, sold VOLA faucets and used pictures with
VOLA faucets to promote the sale of its sink modules.90 Robern continued to use the same
pictures in its promotional materials, despite the fact that for sales it has replaced the
VOLA faucets with the Falling Water faucets in its sink modules.91 Plaintiff Lund brought
suit against *175 defendants Kohler and Robern for trade dress dilution and infringement.
The district court entered preliminary injunction against the defendants on dilution claim,
but not on the infringement claim. The defendants appealed.92
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I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Id. at 34.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 32, 34.
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Id. at 34.
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I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Id. at 34.
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Id. at 35.
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The First Circuit recognized from the outset that this case raised several questions
of first impression in the circuit.93 The First Circuit noted that unlike traditional trademark
and trade dress law, the Dilution Act is not concerned with consumer confusion or the
public interest; 94 the Dilution Act protects only the owners of trademarks or trade
dresses. 95 The First Circuit stated that despite their different purposes, a claim for trade
dress infringement and a claim for trade dress dilution share three elements before the
analyses diverge: (1) the trade dress must be used in commerce; (2) the trade dress must be
non-functional; and (3) the trade dress must be distinctive. 96 The First Circuit held that the
plaintiff in a dilution claim bears the burden of proving that its trade dress is
non-functional. Non-functionality is essential because (a) this doctrine prevents a
constitutional problem between trademark and patent law; (b) Congress could not have
intended to provide Lanham Act protection to functional aspects of products--trademarks
must serve their intended purpose of identifying product source; and (c) the doctrine deters
a plaintiff from bringing unwarranted action since it is the plaintiff who must bear the
burden of non-functionality. 97 Thus, if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate non-functionality,
there is no trade dress protection available under the Dilution Act.98 Accordingly, the First
Circuit remanded the case for a finding on non-functionality, which the district court
previously had failed to conduct.99
*176 As to the fame prong of the analysis, the First Circuit held that that district
court failed to apply the fame factors under the Dilution Act. 100 The district court
erroneously concluded that the VOLA design is distinctive because it had acquired
secondary meaning. 101 Such a per se analysis is incorrect under the Dilution Act that
requires a rigorous analysis of fame.102 The First Circuit found that the VOLA product
design is an unregistered mark and not inherently distinctive, strong or nationally
93

Id. at 32.

94

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998).

95

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 38.
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Id.
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Id. at 51.
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I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Id.
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Id.
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known. 103 Thus, the VOLA product design has not achieved the level of fame required
within the context of the Dilution Act.
As to the dilution prong of the analysis, the First Circuit held that the district court’s
standard for determining dilution through blurring was incorrect.104 The district court had
articulated that the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the use of a junior mark has caused a
lessening of demand for the product or services bearing the famous mark.” 105 The First
Circuit rejected the district court’s actual harm standard because “the demand for one
product is almost always lessened whenever a competing product achieves a measurable
degree of success.”106 A customer’s economic decision to knowingly choose to pay less
for a similar product, balancing the trade off of lower price or greater fame does not
establish dilution through blurring. 107 According to the First Circuit, the correct standard
for determining dilution through blurring is “whether target customers will perceive the
products as essentially the same.” Thus, dilution through blurring “has to do with the *177
identificationoof a product, and that is not the same thing as a lessening of demand.”108
The First Circuit’s standard for determining dilution, however, is contrary to the
Dilution Act and its legislative intent. The Dilution Act only protects famous marks from
dilution, and to achieve the “famous” status within the meaning of the Dilution Act a mark
must be recognized by a large segment of the public in a wide geographical area. 109 Thus,
103

Id.

104

Id. at 49.

105

Id. This actual dilution standard was used by the district court in Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp.
605, 616 (E.D.Va. 1997), and was later adopted by the Fourth Circuit in the same case. See
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
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I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1st Cir. 1998).

107

Id. at 50.

108

Id. at 33, 49-50.

109

America OnLine, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D.Va. Nov. 10,
1998) (stating that the ownership of a distinctive mark is required for a dilution claim under
the Act); Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. The Hoover Co., 1998 WL 427595 *16 (N.D. Ill. July
23, 1998) (“While these marks are registered and have been used for many years on
products sold nationwide, Breuer/Tornado has provided little evidence that these marks
have acquired a degree of recognition sufficient to be considered famous, particularly
outside of the narrow market for commercial vacuums and floor cleaning”); Michael
Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D.Fla. 1998)
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if a famous mark is diluted, it is the general public, not just “target customers,” which after
being exposed to the junior mark and its products, associate the famous mark with the
products bearing the junior mark.110 In addition, the First Circuit’s requirement that the
plaintiff’s product and the defendant’s product must be perceived to be “essentially the
same” has no place in a dilution analysis. Such a requirement is more appropriate with the
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. The First Circuit essentially requires that in a
dilution analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the consumer perceives the products
as coming from the same source! This requirement contradicts the language of the Dilution
Act and its legislative intent; there is no such requirement in the Act. In addition, the First
Circuit decision ignores the fact that the definition of dilution under the Dilution Act is the
“lessening of the capacity of a famous mark *178 to identify and distinguish goods or
services.” The likely outcome of such actual dilution of the famous mark would be that the
famous mark no longer has the reputation and prestige that it once enjoyed, and thus the
demand for the products bearing the famous mark would be less than before the junior
mark was used.
The First Circuit, however, raised a serious constitutional issue relating to the reach
of the Dilution Act. The First Circuit examined whether the Dilution Act protects product
design or configuration. Though recognizing that the Dilution Act does not restrict the
definition of “famous mark” to just word marks,111 the First Circuit observed that there is a
fundamental problem in applying the dilution law to the product design in a case involving
competing products.112 The First Circuit expressed its doubt that Congress intended the
reach of the Dilution Act to extend to the designs of competing products because (a)
dilution theories such as blurring and tarnishment can easily apply to word marks but are
more difficult to apply to product design marks; (b) legislative history of the Dilution Act
provides examples of blurring and tarnishment to word marks only; and (c) it is difficult to
prove dilution of the source identifying function of a product design in a case where some
of the product design is “partially replicated and the result is largely dissimilar and does not
create consumer confusion.”113 The First Circuit even speculated that it is possible that
(“Even if a mark is distinctive in its particular market, [this] does not render it inherently
distinctive so as to engender immediate recognition in the general public of a particular
product”). One court found a plaintiff’s mark not famous though the mark has been in use
and widely advertised for 46 years in connection with eight grocery stores, while another
court found a plaintiff’s mark famous that has been in use for 90 years in connection with
grocery chain stores in the Northeast region. See Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F.
Supp. 1030 (D. Hawai’i 1996); WAWA v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
110

McCarthy, supra notes 48.
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I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 50.
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Congress did not envision anti-dilution protection for product design against a competing
product under the Dilution Act;114 however, the court recognized that the language of the
Dilution Act does not permit a court to categorically deny such protection to product
design.115 Nevertheless, “rare cases can be imagined.”116 Thus, the court refused to read
the statute broadly for fear that such reading would bring the Circuit “to the constitutional
edge” and require a “rigorous review” of product design cases under the Dilution Act.117
*179 B. The Fourth Circuit: Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development.
Plaintiff Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey had been using the mark THE
GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH in association with its circus since 1872. The plaintiff
obtained a federal registration for its mark in 1961. 118 The plaintiff has extensively
advertised and promoted its mark, and the budget for such marketing purposes was $19
million for its most recent fiscal year.119 On average, more than 70 million people each
year are exposed to the mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH in connection with
plaintiff Ringling. 120 Revenues derived from goods and services bearing the mark
exceeded $103 million for the most recent fiscal year. 121 To protect its mark from
114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id.

117

I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998). See also
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming an
injunction on the infringement ground). In this case, plaintiff Sunbeam was the
manufacturer of stand food mixers since 1930. The stand food mixer had its present design
since 1979 and is named “the America Classic.” Defendant West Bend introduced its
“Legend” stand mixer market, which closely resembled plaintiff’s stand mixer design. The
defendant sold the Legend stand mixer for $20 less than the plaintiff’s product. The
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringement and dilution. The district court entered an
injunction in plaintiff’s favor on the infringement ground and alternatively held that an
injunction would be appropriate against the defendant under the Dilution Act. The
defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit on all grounds.
118

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999).
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See Id.
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See Id.
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See Id.
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unauthorized use, the plaintiff has expended a substantial effort to police the mark against
third party use with an enforcement program. 122 On the other hand, defendant Utah
Division of Travel Development, an agency of the State of Utah, used the mark THE
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH in connection *180 with Utah tourism services since
1962.123 The defendant, however, did not use its mark continuously; it ceased using the
mark in 1963, 1977 and 1989. 124 The plaintiff brought a dilution claim under the Dilution
Act against the defendant and lost at a bench trial. The district court held that defendant
Utah Travel Division’s use of the mark THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH did not
dilute plaintiff Ringling’s mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH.125 The plaintiff
appealed to the Fourth Circuit that later affirmed the district court’s decision.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit did not find the need to analyze fame. 126 The Fourth
Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s mark is
famous since over 40% of respondents in the United States, both inside and outside of
Utah, were able to complete the incomplete phrase THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH
with the word SHOW and to associate that mark with the Ringling Circus, thus finding that
the plaintiff’s mark is famous. 127
122

See Ringling II, 955 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D.Va. 1997).

123

See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 451.

124

See Id.

125

See Ringling II at 621.

126

Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999) (“At trial, Ringling put on essentially undisputed
evidence demonstrating that its mark had achieved ‘famous’ status before Utah began use
of its mark. This left as the dispositive issue whether Utah’s mark had ‘diluted’ Ringling’s
by ‘blurring’ it.”)
127

The survey results in Utah were

(i) 25% of respondents completed the statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH
with only the word SHOW and associated the completed statement with the Circus; (ii)
24% completed that statement with only the word SNOW and associated the completed
statement with [defendant]; and (iii) 21% of respondents completed that statement with
SHOW and associated the result with the Circus and also completed this statement with
SNOW and associated the completed statement with [defendant]. So in Utah, a total of
46% of respondents completed the statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH with
the word SHOW and associated the completed statement with the Circus, and a total of
45% of respondents completed that statement with the word SNOW and associated the
completed statement with [defendant].

Ringling II, 955 F. Supp. at 612-3 n.4.
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*181 The Fourth Circuit devoted most of its opinion on the dilution analysis. It
examined state dilution statutes, the Dilution Act and its legislative history. 128 It observed
that unlike state statutes, which protect famous marks from future harm, the Dilution Act
protects a famous mark from actual economic harm inflicted on the former selling power of
the famous mark by defendant’s use of the junior mark. 129 The Fourth Circuit found
support for its interpretation in the language of the Act. According to the Fourth Circuit, the
Act requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the junior mark actually causes
dilution, as opposed to “will” or “may” cause dilution.130 In another words, the Dilution
Act focuses on the past measurable harm and not on the future unmeasurable harm.
The Fourth Circuit further held that the Dilution Act requires proof that (a) a
defendant used a junior mark sufficiently similar to a famous mark to evoke a mental
association of the two marks perceived by consumers who were exposed to the marks; (b)
the famous mark suffered actual economic harm, i.e., a lessening of its former selling
power for its products or services; and (c) the defendant’s use of the junior mark caused
that harm. 131
With this new standard of dilution, the Fourth Circuit rejected the survey evidence
presented by the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the
plaintiff’s survey evidence failed to show that defendant Utah’s use of the junior mark had
caused any actual harm to the plaintiff’s mark in the form of a lessening of that mark’s
former capacity to identify and distinguish the plaintiff’s circus as its subject. 132 The
plaintiff contented that, within Utah, only 25% of respondents, as compared to 41%
nationwide, associate the incomplete statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH with
Ringling alone because defendant’s use of its mark has caused respondents in Utah to
associate the uses of Ringling’s and *182 defendant’s marks. 133 The district court rejected
the plaintiff’s contention because Ringling’s survey also demonstrated that 46% of
respondents in Utah, as compared to 41% elsewhere, associated THE GREATEST SHOW
ON EARTH with Ringling. 134 Thus, no evidence in the survey demonstrated that the
defendant’s use of THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH lessens the capacity of
128

Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453-461.
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Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 462-63 (4th Cir. 1999).
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plaintiff’s mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH. 135 The power of plaintiff’s
famous mark to identify and distinguish Ringling’s circus was as strong within Utah as it
was outside of Utah. Thus, there was no actual dilution of plaintiff’s mark.136
As to proof of dilution, the Fourth Circuit in Ringling obviously misread the
dilution law and thus misinterpreted the survey evidence of dilution. The interpretation that
the Dilution Act requires proof of actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling
power is contrary to a long line of jurisprudence on dilution. 137 Dilution through the
blurring theory does not require consumers in the defendant’s market to be confused or
mistaken in their associations of famous and junior marks. 138 Dilution indeed occurs if
consumers think of both a famous and junior mark at the same time, but properly recognize
that the two products come *183 from two different sources.139 Further, dilution is a slow
process of whittling away the selling power of a trademark. 140
The Ringling court buttressed its conclusion of no dilution by pointing to the survey
evidence establishing that respondents in Utah, the epicenter of injury to the plaintiff’s
mark, showed a higher degree of recognition of plaintiff’s mark than respondents
elsewhere. The Ringling court’s analysis of the survey evidence creates a nightmare for
owners of known trademarks. If an owner establishes fame through a consumer survey,
that finding may then be used as evidence that recognition power has not diminished, so
there will be no finding of injury or dilution to the mark!141
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Id.

136

Id.
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See Patrick Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution,
70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295 (1999); Reichman, supra note 57; Melanie M. Routh, Note,
Trademark Dilution and the Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 50 Rutgers L.
Rev. 253 (reviewing seventeen cases that have applied the Act and concluding that courts
have given the dilution theory a newfound respect and are more willing to recognize
dilution as a cause of action that can stand alone); Gregg Duffey, Comment, Trademark
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: You’ve Come a Long Way
Baby-- Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 133, 164 (1997); Serad, supra note 61
(discussion on “famous” and its effects on average business owners).
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A commentator has also criticized the Ringling decision, noting that the court
failed to recognize that dilution “does not require consumers in the defendant’s market to
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C. The Eighth Circuit: Luigino’s v. Stouffer Corp.
In this case, plaintiff Stouffer has been successfully marketing its low-fat frozen
entrees under the registered trademark LEAN CUISINE since 1978. As a competitor of the
plaintiff in the frozen entrees market, defendant Luigino introduced its low-fat frozen
entrees under the “Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tasty” mark in 1996. The plaintiff immediately
requested defendant to cease using the Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tasty mark. The defendant
refused and brought a declaratory judgment that its mark did not dilute the LEAN
CUISINE mark.142 The plaintiff counterclaimed for dilution.143
*184 According to the Eighth Circuit, dilution occurs when consumers associate a
famous mark that has traditionally identified the mark owner’s goods with a new and
different source.144 By causing consumers to associate the famous mark with different
goods, the junior mark weakens the famous mark’s unique and distinctive connection to a
particular product.vThus, to establish a trademark dilution claim, the plaintiff must show
that (a) its LEAN CUISINE mark is famous; (b) the defendant began using a similar mark
after the LEAN CUISINE mark became famous; and (c) the defendant’s mark dilutes the
distinctive quality of the LEAN CUISINE mark by causing consumers to connect the
LEAN CUISINE mark with different products.145 Since the defendant conceded that the
plaintiff’s LEAN CUISINE mark is famous, the Eighth Circuit focused its attention on
“similarity and dilution.”146
The Eighth Circuit noted that the two marks are not similar enough to support an
action for dilution by blurring. 147 The Eighth Circuit’s requirement that the marks be
be confused or mistaken in their associations. Dilution occurs if a consumer thinks of both
marks at the same time and properly recognizes that the mark identifies two sources.”
Thus, based on its misreading of dilution law, the Ringling court misinterpreted the survey
evidence on dilution. Reichman, supra note 57, at 134-35.
142

Luigino’s v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1999). Defendant
Luigino also sought a declaratory judgment that its mark did not infringe on the LEAN
CUISINE mark.
143

Plaintiff also counter-claimed for infringement. Id.
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similar is at odds with the plain language of the Dilution Act, which does not require that
the junior mark be similar to the famous mark.148 The Eighth Circuit drew its support for
its requirement from Professor McCarthy who has suggested that the junior mark and the
famous mark must “at least be similar enough that a significant segment of the target group
of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.”149
As to the dilution issue, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that dilution
occurs because consumers associate both marks with tasty, low-fat frozen entrees.150 The
plaintiff’s argument, the court stated, is contrary to trademark law, which does not give the
plaintiff the exclusive right to use a mark that consumers associate with tasty, low-fat
frozen entrees.151 The court held that to succeed on a *185 dilution claim, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant’s mark causes consumers toaassociate the LEAN
CUISINE mark with something other than plaintiff’s frozen entrees. Since the plaintiff
failed to offer such evidence for its dilution claim, summary judgment in the defendant’s
favor was affirmed. 152
The Eighth Circuit’s standard for determining dilution is markedly different from
the First Circuit’s and Fourth Circuit’s. The Eighth Circuit requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate that the defendant’s mark is causing consumers to associate the famous mark
with something other than its own products. This test is different from the First Circuit’s
test to see if the target customers perceive the plaintiff’s product and the defendant’s
product as the same. The Eighth Circuit’s standard is also different from the Fourth
Circuit’s requirement of a showing of actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling
power due to the defendant’s use of the junior mark.
The standard adopted by the Eighth Circuit to determine dilution is consistent with
the theory of dilution through blurring which Professor Schechter formulated in 1927.153
Dilution through blurring occurs when a customer is exposed to the junior mark,
remembers the famous mark, and associates the famous mark with the new products or
services that bear the junior mark. The Eighth Circuit decision, however, failed to explain
how and what kind of evidence a plaintiff should offer to demonstrate that the defendant’s
148
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mark causes consumers to associate the famous mark with different products. It does not
clarify in the language of the decision whether actual dilution or likelihood of dilution must
be shown, nor the degree of dilution a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to prevail. The
Eighth Circuit’s silence on these issues just keeps the circus spinning so fast that the
audience and performers are all dizzy.
D. The Ninth Circuit: Panavision International v. Toeppen
This case involved an Internet domain name dispute. Plaintiff Panavision is the
owner of the trademark PANAVISION for motion picture camera equipment.154 Plaintiff
attempted to register panavision.com as a domain name but could not *186 because
defendant Toeppen had already established a website with such name. 155 Defendant
Toeppen was in the business of registering domain names of companies such as Delta
Airlines, Neiman Marcus, and Eddie Bauer and subsequently offering to sell the domain
names back to the respective company. 156 The defendant offered to sell the
Panavision.com domain name to plaintiff for $13,000.157 The plaintiff refused and brought
an anti-dilution claim against defendant.
The Ninth Circuit examined the language of the Dilution Act and its legislative
history, finding the traditional theories of dilution through blurring and tarnishment
inapplicable to the Internet domain name dispute. 158 The court ignored the fame
requirement and proceeded to analyze dilution of a trademark in the Internet context.159
The court found that the legislative intent of the Dilution Act was clearly aimed at
stemming the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who choose marks that are
associated with the products and reputations of others. 160 Thus, dilution occurred in the
Internet case where the defendant’s conduct diminished the capacity of the Panavision
mark to identify and distinguish Panavision’s goods and services on the Internet. 161
Indeed, because of the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark as a domain name, the
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plaintiff’s potential customers are discouraged if they cannot quickly locate the Internet
site for Panavision because Panavision.com is being used by the defendant, and as a result
potential customers would have to wade through hundreds of web sites to find the real site.
The defendant’s conduct is holding the plaintiff’s Panavision mark and reputation
hostage.162 The Ninth Circuit concluded that defendant’s registration of *187 plaintiff’s
Panavision mark as its domain name on the Internet diluted that mark within the meaning
of the Dilution Act.163
The Ninth Circuit decision adds a different twist to the interpretation of the Dilution
Act. As noted above, the court completely ignored the fame analysis. 164 Had the court
engaged in the fame analysis examining the factors listed in the subsection (c)(1) of the
Dilution Act, the court could not have concluded that “Panavision” is a famous mark
within the meaning of the Dilution Act. The Ninth Circuit apparently interpreted
congressional intent to hold that the Dilution Act prohibits the use of domain names taken
by those who deliberately chose domain names that are similar to trademarks belonging to
others. Indeed, as justification for its finding of dilution, the Ninth Circuit quoted Senator
Patrick Leahy’s statement that trademark dilution on the Internet was a matter of
congressional concern. 165 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit ignored the fame analysis under
the Act. The danger in a blanket application of the Dilution Act to the Internet without
engaging in the fame analysis raises potential problems of according undeserving marks on
the Internet the famous status while refusing the more deserving marks the same status.
Thus, some marks that should not be entitled to federal anti-dilution protection get the
protection merely because these marks have been used as domain names without
permission of the trademark owners.
V. The Fun at the Circus is over
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*188 The conflicting rulings from various appellate courts on the application and
interpretation of the Dilution Act will spin trademark owners and practitioners in different
directions. The hope for a more uniform dilution law has been shattered by inharmonious
and fragmented interpretations of the Dilution Act from appellate courts.
At the present time, a number of federal circuit courts have had the opportunity to
address the Dilution Act, and each has a different interpretation. As demonstrated above,
the First and Fourth Circuits’ standards to determine dilution are 180 degrees apart. The
First Circuit rejects the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the defendant’s use of the junior mark lessens the demand for products or services
bearing the famous mark. The First Circuit, instead imposes a test of whether the target
customers would perceive the plaintiff’s products and defendant’s products as essentially
the same. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant’s use of the junior mark has caused the famous mark actual economic harm,
i.e., the famous mark’s selling power is less than what it was prior to the defendant’s use of
the junior mark. The Eighth Circuit articulates a third standard: it requires the plaintiff to
show that the defendant’s use of the junior mark is causing consumers to associate the
famous mark with something other than its own products. The Ninth Circuit interprets the
Act to address congressional concern on trademark use on the Internet. The Ninth Circuit
ignores the fame analysis altogether and fashions a new dilution theory of diminishment.
Under this theory, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant’s use of the
trademark is discouraging the plaintiff’s potential customers from surfing the web to get to
the plaintiff’s site. The customers may have to wade through hundreds of sites before they
reach the plaintiff’s site since the defendant occupies the obvious site name.
Moving towards a more harmonious and uniform interpretation of the Dilution Act
requires the courts to acknowledge from the outset that only truly famous marks are
entitled to federal anti-dilution protection. The fame analysis is critical to the overall
dilution analysis. By engaging in vigorous review of whether a mark has achieved fame
and distinctiveness as required by the Dilution Act, courts will eliminate the potential
problem of protecting non-famous, and thus undeserving, marks, which are known only in
small market niches or limited geographical areas. The starting point of analyzing fame is
the list of eight factors in subsection (c)(1) of section 43 of the Lanham Act.
After determining whether a mark is famous within the meaning of the Dilution
Act, the courts need to determine the appropriate standard for ascertaining whether a
famous mark is diluted and the degree of dilution. Again, the starting point for a dilution
analysis is the language of the Dilution Act itself, which provides federal protection to
owners of famous marks against “another person’s commercial *189 use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous mark.”166 The Dilution Act defines dilution
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as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence of absence of (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”167
Most courts seem to disagree on the definition of dilution and how to demonstrate dilution.
Though legislative history of the Dilution Act and the language of the Act itself fail
to provide any examples of dilution through blurring that causes “the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,” courts should
recognize that dilution through blurring is a slow process. To require a plaintiff to show
actual economic harm suffered by the famous mark is unreasonable, if not impossible.
Such proof would require owners of famous marks to wait until they could quantify the
actual economic harm to the famous mark. By that time it is probably too late for the owner
to get a preliminary injunction, or worse: the defendant may use laches and numerous third
party use as defenses. A likelihood of dilution standard would be more realistic a test for
the plaintiff to demonstrate. Likelihood of dilution can be shown through consumer survey
evidence that follows acceptable criteria of survey research. Additionally, since the
language of the Dilution Act does not require owners of famous marks to show source
confusion, courts should avoid imposing the “source confusion” test such as the First
Circuit did when requiring that the plaintiff in a dilution claim to demonstrate that the
products were perceived by target customers as essentially the same.
As to product design marks, courts should not dodge the issues: non-functional
product design marks are entitled to federal anti-dilution protection just as word marks
would be. As long as a product design mark meets (1) all the criteria of a trademark, i.e.,
the product design is inherently distinctive, identifies source, and is non-functional; and (2)
all the criteria of a famous mark as listed in subsection (c)(1), it is then entitled to the
anti-dilution protection under the Dilution Act. The dilution analysis should then proceed
as in any other cases involving famous marks. Step 1 would ensure that the conflict
between patent and trademark laws is resolved by only providing trademark protection for
product designs that are inherently distinctive, act like source identifiers and are
non-functional. Step 2 would ensure that only famous product design marks are entitled to
federal anti-dilution *190 protection. This would put to rest concerns relating to perpetual
patent-like protection for product designs. These steps involve vigorous analyses, and most
likely, very few product designs could pass muster.
V. Conclusion
With the discrepancies and inconsistencies among the standards employed by the
various circuits, if a more uniform approach to dilution is not soon reached, forum
shopping is unavoidable. Trademark owners would seek district courts in a circuit that has
a more lenient requirement for proof of dilution. If the conflict among the Circuits is
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irreconcilable, it may be time for the Supreme Court or Congress to clarify the appropriate
standard of determining dilution.
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